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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joshua Miller appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress drug evidence
found inside his pocket as the result of a police officer's warrantless detention and weapons frisk,
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. At the time he initiated the detention and the
search, the officer had no reason to suspect Mr. Miller of criminal activity, and no reason to
believe he was armed and presently dangerous. However, the district court invoked the doctrine
of inevitable discovery and decided that the exclusionary rule did not apply, and the court chose
not to decide any of the issues involving the officer's violation of Mr. Miller's constitutional
rights.
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Miller argues that the district court erred in its application of
the inevitable discovery doctrine in that the court based its decision on a hypothetical that was
speculative, not inevitable, and that conflicted with the district court's own findings, and that
substituted alternative facts for what the officer actually did.

He additionally argued that,

because the State failed to carry its burden of demonstrating facts to justify the officer's
warrantless detention and search, this Court should reverse the district court's order denying
suppression and vacate Mr. Miller's conviction.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State makes no attempt to defend the officer's
unconstitutional actions of unreasonably detaining and searching Mr. Miller's person.

(See

generally Resp.Br., pp.6-11.) Nor does the State advance its earlier theory for invoking the
inevitable discovery doctrine based on the existence of an active parole warrant. (See generally
Resp.Br., pp.6-11.) Rather, the State argues solely that this Court should affirm based on the
district court's specific application of the inevitable discovery doctrine.
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(Resp.Br., pp.6-11.)

This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's assertion and to demonstrate that the district
court's proposed "hypothetical" is in conflict with its own factual findings and rests upon
alternative facts that are purely speculative, and not inevitable.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Miller's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Miller's Motion To Suppress
Completely and conspicuously absent from the State's appellate argument (see generally
Resp.Br., pp.6-11), are the district court's findings that Officer Anderson's attention was
"consumed by" and exclusively "focused on" Mr. Miller's presence during the entire time
Mr. Miller was in the bedroom, and that the officer did not scan the room for other evidence until
after he had arrested Mr. Miller and removed him from the room. (See R., pp.71, 72, 75.) These
facts show that, so long as Mr. Miller was present, Officer Anderson was unable to notice the
drug contraband that was out in plain view. However, the district court also found that when
Officer Anderson entered the room, Mr. Miller was sitting calmly on the sofa until the officer
ordered his to stand up and handcuffed him, searched and arrested him, and had him removed
from the room. (R., p.71.)
There is no finding, nor factual basis for a finding, that Mr. Miller would have left the
room but-for the officer's unlawful seizure and search, and the totality of the circumstances including the fact Mr. Miller had been sitting quietly on the sofa until he was ordered to stand show otherwise. (See generally, R., pp.70-80).
Additionally, there is no finding, nor factual basis for finding or concluding, that while
Mr. Miller remained in the room, Officer Anderson would have ceased being consumed by
Mr. Miller's presence, or at least ceased being consumed at anytime before the officer "picked
up on" the nearby shouts of his fellow officers that the child he had supposedly been looking for
had been located and was safe.

(See generally, R., pp. 70-80).

On the contrary, Officer

Anderson's testimony shows that that, had he not been engaged with and distracted by
Mr. Miller's presence, the officer would have "picked up" on the fact that the child had already
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been located (Tr., p.30, Ls.4-6), thus ending the exigency and with it, the officer's authority to
search ("scan") Mr. Miller's bedroom.

See, e.g., State v. Franklin, 160 Idaho 860, 864

(Ct. App. 2016) (recognizing that an exigency-based search expires with the exigency).
The factual scenario fashioned by the district court (R., pp.76-78), and argued by the
State (Resp.Br., pp.6-11 ), is not one that was "inevitable" based on the facts found; it is
incompatible with those findings.

Instead, the district court's hypothetical supposes an

alternative Officer Anderson, one who was so distracted by what the movement in Mr. Miller's
room that he could not hear and "pick up" on the fact that his fellow officers had already located
the child, but who at the same time was not distracted and "consumed by" Mr. Miller presence
when the officer entered his room.

(See R., pp.76-78.) Such a hypothetical, while perhaps

possible, is one that is unreasonable and unlikely. In any case, it is not a hypothetical of the
inevitable unfolding of events. Rather, it substitutes what an Officer Anderson could or should
have done, for what Officer Anderson actually did. As argued in the Appellant's Brief, at pages
25-30, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected such an application in State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26,
30 (2017).
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons and those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Miller respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying suppression, vacate his
conviction, and remand his case to the district court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea as
provided by the terms of his plea agreement.

DATED this 24 day of September 2019.

ls/Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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JOSHUA JAY MILLER
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PETER BARTON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-Service: pbarton@adaweb.net
N GENE ALEXANDER
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE
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DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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